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Abstract
Ordering alternatives by their degree of ambiguity is a crucial element in decision
processes in general and in asset pricing in particular. So far the literature has not
provided an applicable measure of ambiguity allowing for such ordering. The current
paper addresses this need by introducing a novel empirically applicable ambiguity measure
derived from a new model of decision making under ambiguity, called shadow probability
theory, in which probabilities of events are themselves random. In this model a complete
distinction is attained between preferences and beliefs and between risk and ambiguity that
enables the degree of ambiguity to be measured. The merits of the model are demonstrated
by incorporating ambiguous probabilities into asset pricing and it is proved that the well-
dened ambiguity premium that the paper proposes can be measured empirically.
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1 Introduction
How should uncertain alternatives be ranked by the criterion of ambiguity? Consider, for
example, the following: a large urn contains 30 balls which are either black or yellow and a
second smaller urn contains only 10 balls which are also either black or yellow. In both cases
the proportions of black and yellow balls are unknown. Which of the following two bets is more
ambiguous? "a ball drawn from the large urn is black" or "a ball drawn from the small urn is
black."1 Ordering dierent alternatives by their degree of ambiguity is an important element of
any decision process, insofar as answering questions of this type is part of almost any real-life
decision. However, so far the literature has not provided a useable measure of ambiguity that
allows for such ordering. For example, the neoclassical nance literature, dealing with risk
tolerance usually ignores the presence of ambiguity and unrealistically assumes that decision
makers (DMs) are able to precisely evaluate the probability distribution of returns on assets.
The main reason for this oversight is simply a lack of methods for ambiguity measurement.
The goal of this paper is to provide a theoretical basis and applicable measure that addresses
this need.
This paper makes three contributions to the existing literature. The rst and the main con-
tribution is that it introduces a novel, empirically applicable, ambiguity measure, underpinned
by a new theoretical concept.2 The second contribution is that it presents a decision-making
model to derive this measure which achieves a complete distinction between preferences and
beliefs and between risk and ambiguity, thereby enabling an exploration of the nature of am-
biguity and the behavioral aspects of attitude toward ambiguity. The advantage of isolating
ambiguity from risk and beliefs from preferences is twofold: rst, the degree of ambiguity can
be measured independently of preferences, especially in empirical studies; second, aspects of
preferences concerning ambiguity can be easily monitored in behavioral studies. The third con-
tribution is that it generalizes classical asset pricing theory to incorporate ambiguity, providing
a well-dened mathematical formula for the ambiguity premium which is clearly distinguished
from risk, and can be tested empirically.
Assuming that probabilities of events are themselves random, this paper introduces a novel
1Formally, risk is dened as a situation in which the event to be realized is a-priori unknown, but the odds
of all possible events are perfectly known. Ambiguity, or Knightian uncertainty, is the case where not only is the
event to be realized a-priori unknown, but the odds of all possible events are also either not uniquely assigned
or are unknown.
2Throughout this paper the term ambiguity measure is used literally and not formally.
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model of decision making, called shadow probability theory (shadow theory for short), which
aims to capture the multi-dimensional nature of uncertainty. In this model, there are two tiers
of uncertainty, one with respect to consequences (outcomes) and the other with respect to the
probabilities of these consequences. Each tier is modeled by a separate state space. This struc-
ture introduces a complete distinction of risk from ambiguity with regard to both beliefs and
preferences. The degree of ambiguity and the DM's attitude toward it are then measured with
respect to one space, while risk and risk attitude apply to the second space. As a consequence
of random probabilities and probabilistic sensitivity (i.e., the nonlinear ways in which individ-
uals may interpret probabilities) perceived probabilities are nonadditive. Ambiguity aversion
results in a subadditive subjective probability measure, while ambiguity seeking results in a
superadditive measure.
The main idea of shadow theory is that, like measuring the degree of risk by the variance of
outcomes, the degree of ambiguity can be measured by the variance of probabilities.3 However,
concerning the variance of probabilities, the question is: to the probability of which event is
the variance applied? Given a classication of outcomes as a loss or as a gain, this paper proves
that the degree of ambiguity can be measured by four times the variance of the probability of
loss, which is equal to four times the variance of the probability of gain. Formally, our measure
of ambiguity is given by
f2 = 4Var [PL] = 4Var [PG] ;
where PL and PG are the random probabilities of loss and gain, respectively, and the variance is
taken with respect to second-order probabilities. The intuition behind this new measure is that
ambiguity is caused by a perturbation of probabilities with respect to a meaningful reference
point. Its main advantage is that it can be easily computed from the data and can be used in
empirical tests (see, for example, Brenner and Izhakian (2011)).
Measuring the degree of ambiguity allows alternatives to be ranked by the criterion of
ambiguity. It provides a way to address important questions that arise regarding the nature
of ambiguity, in general, and the nature of the aggregate ambiguity of portfolios, in particular.
The nature of ambiguity and the relationship between risk and ambiguity may shed some light
on various puzzling nancial phenomena. Notable examples are the fact that individuals tend
to hold very small portfolios, 3-4 stocks (Goetzmann and Kumar (2008)), the equity premium
3Measuring risk by the variance of outcomes is admissible under some conditions; the same is true for
measuring ambiguity by the variance of probabilities.
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puzzle (Mehra and Prescott (1985)), the risk-free rate puzzle (Weil (1989)), the phenomenon
of the observed equity volatility being too high to be justied by changes in the fundamentals
(Shiller (1981)), and the home bias puzzle (Coval and Moskowitz (1999)).
To demonstrate the value of shadow theory and its measure of ambiguity, this paper gener-
alizes asset pricing theory to incorporate ambiguity. Relaxing the assumption that probabilities
are known, the price of an asset in our model is determined not only by its degree of risk and
the DM's attitude toward this risk, but also by its degree of ambiguity and the DM's attitude
toward it. The current paper constructs the uncertainty premium and proves that it can be
separated into a risk premium and an ambiguity premium.4 It provides a well-dened ambiguity
premium, completely distinguished from risk and attitude toward risk, which can be computed
from the data. Using this model, in their empirical study Brenner and Izhakian (2011) show
that ambiguity, measured by f2, has a signicant impact on the market portfolio's return. We
are not aware of any other prior study that conducts direct empirical tests of models of decision
making under ambiguity other than through parametric tting and calibrations.5
Shadow theory relies on the Choquet expected utility (CEU) of Schmeidler (1989), whose ax-
iomatic derivation paved the way for modeling decision making under ambiguity. Gilboa (1987)
and Schmeidler (1989), in their pioneering studies, introduce the idea that, in the presence of
ambiguity, the probabilities that reect the DM's willingness to bet cannot be additive, i.e.,
the sum of the probabilities can be either smaller or greater than 1. Shadow theory combines
the concept of nonadditive probabilities with the idea of reference-dependent beliefs. Reference
dependency is applied to dierentiate between the probability of gain and the probability of
loss. It allows characterizing the DM's preferences concerning ambiguity, with regard to these
obscure probabilities, with the dierent possible attitudes toward ambiguity when it concerns
loss and when it concerns gain.
Tversky and Kahneman's (1992) Cumulative prospect theory (CPT) also applies a two-sided
CEU to gains and to losses.6 However, CPT focuses on reference-dependent preferences and
assumes a DM having dierent risk attitudes for losses and for gains, and asymmetric capacities
4This paper uses the term uncertainty to describe the aggregation of risk and ambiguity.
5Uppal and Wang (2003), Epstein and Schneider (2008), and Ju and Miao (2011), for example calibrate
their model to the data. Several papers attribute dierent explanatory variables to ambiguity. For example,
Anderson et al. (2009) attribute the degree of disagreement of professional forecasters to ambiguity, and Erbas
and Mirakhor (2007) use the World Bank institutional quality indexes as a proxy for ambiguity.
6Using the perception of rank-dependent and cumulative functionals proposed by Weymark (1981), Quiggin
(1982), Yaari (1987) and Schmeidler (1989), CPT generalizes the original prospect theory of Kahneman and
Tversky (1979) from risk to uncertainty. It modies the probability weighting functionals of the original prospect
theory, such that it always satises stochastic dominance and supports an innite state space.
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with dierent arbitrary weighting schemes for losses and for gains.7 Shadow theory general-
izes CPT and shows that capacities are not arbitrary and can be explained by the presence
of ambiguity and the DM's preferences regarding it.8 It relies on the axiomatic foundation
proposed by Wakker (2010) for both preferences concerning risk and preferences concerning
ambiguity. Practically, shadow theory provides a bridge between the two main disciplines of
modeling ambiguity: the multiple priors (Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989)) and the nonadditive
probabilities (Gilboa (1987) and Schmeidler (1989)).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces shadow theory. Section
3 applies this theory to a new decision-making model under uncertainty and characterizes
DMs' attitudes toward ambiguity. Using this model, Section 4 suggests a novel measure of
ambiguity. To demonstrate an application of shadow theory for asset pricing, Section 5 models
the ambiguity premium and reviews some empirical results that test it. Section 6 discusses our
theoretical results with respect to the related literature and Section 7 concludes.
2 Shadow probability theory
Shadow theory assumes two dierent tiers of uncertainty, one with respect to consequences
and the other with respect to the probabilities of these consequences. Each tier is modeled by
a separate state space. Uncertainty with respect to consequences (outcomes) is modeled by
a subordinated outcome space, while uncertainty with respect to probabilities is modeled by a
directing probability space. In this section, we model the subordinated space and then add the
second tier of uncertainty, with respect to probabilities, by modeling the directing space. First,
we demonstrate the concept of ambiguity that emerges from our model with an illustration.
2.1 Illustration
To illustrate the new insight gained by shadow theory about the nature of ambiguity and the
way individuals perceive it, consider an Ellsberg urn with 90 colored balls, 30 of which are
red and the other 60 either black or yellow. Ellsberg (1961) suggested the following two-part
experiment. In each part of the experiment, before a ball is drawn at random from the urn,
7Capacities mean probabilities, possibly nonadditive. This paper usually uses the term probability in a
broad sense, i.e., it can be nonadditive and either subjective or objective. The terms subjective probabilities
and capacities are used interchangeably.
8To explain capacities, shadow theory does not assume asymmetric risk attitude, dierent ambiguity prefer-
ences for losses and for gains, or loss aversion.
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a DM is oered two alternative bets; winning the bet entitles her to a sum of $9. In the rst
part, the DM has to choose between two alternative bets: the ball drawn is red (R) or the
ball drawn is black (B). Then, in the second part, the DM has to choose between betting on:
the ball drawn is red or yellow (RY ) or alternatively the ball drawn is black or yellow (BY ).
Behavioral experiments have demonstrated that individuals usually prefer R over B, but BY
over RY .9
Shadow theory can help us to understand the choices that emerge from these experiment.
The subordinated space is dened by the states of drawing dierent balls, i.e., fR; Y;Bg, with
random probabilities. The probability of B can be one of the possible values 0
90
; 1
90
; 2
90
; : : : ; 60
90
.
The precise probability of B is dominated by a second-order unobservable event in a directing
space. Such an event can be, for example, "The experimenter put 30 red balls, 20 black balls
and 40 yellow balls in the urn." The DM, however, does not have any additional information
indicating which of the possible probabilities is more likely and thus she assigns an equal weight
to each possibility.
The DM considers strictly positive outcomes ($9) as a gain; and otherwise, ($0) as a loss.
Computing the variance of the probability of gain from B to obtain the measure of ambiguity
indicates that its degree of ambiguity is f2 [B] = 0:1530. Since the probability of R is known,
1
3
, its degree of ambiguity is f2 [R] = 0. Clearly, since the expected outcomes of R and B are
identical, an ambiguity-averse DM prefers R, with the lower degree of ambiguity, over B. The
probability of gain from RY can take one of the possible values 30
90
; 31
90
; : : : 90
90
, which in turn also
implies an ambiguity degree of f2 [RY ] = 0:1530. The probability of gain from the alternative
BY is exactly 2
3
, which implies f2 [BY ] = 0. Obviously, an ambiguity-averse DM prefers BY
over RY . Table 1 is a stylized description of this example.
R Y B Prob E f2
(R) 9 0 0 13 3 0
(B) 0 0 9 090 ;
1
90 ;
2
90 ; : : : ;
60
90 3 0:1530
(RY ) 9 9 0 3090 ;
31
90 ;
32
90 ; : : : ;
90
90 6 0:1530
(BY ) 0 9 9 23 6 0
Table 1: The Ellsberg example
9In expected utility theory, the DM's assessments of the likelihoods of R, B and Y can be described by some
probability measure P. The DM is assumed to prefer a greater chance of winning $9 to a smaller chance of
winning $9, such that the choices above imply that P (R) > P (B) and P (B [ Y ) > P (R [ Y ). However, since
R, B and Y are mutually exclusive events, no such probability measure exists; hence, it is considered a paradox.
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2.2 The subordinated space
Observable events and their consequences are dened by the subordinated space. The proba-
bilities of these events are uncertain; as a consequence, perceived probabilities are nonadditive.
The foundation of Schmeidler's (1989) CEU and Tversky and Kahneman's (1992) CPT of also
assume that priors are nonadditive, but do not characterize the sources shaping these pri-
ors. The structure of the subordinated space relies on this foundation, while the reasoning for
nonadditive priors is provided later by the directing space.
Let S be a (nite or innite) state space, called the subordinated space, endowed with an
algebra of subsets of S.10;11 It is assumed that exactly one state can be realized, which is
unknown to the DM when she makes her choice. Subsets of S are called events and are denoted
by E . The complementary event, Ec, consists of all states s 2 S not contained in E . The set of
events, , is a -algebra of subsets of S. Dene X to be the set of consequences, where, since
this paper mostly deals with monetary outcomes, consequences are conned to real numbers,
X  R.12
An act is a function from states into consequences, f : S ! X, describing the resulting
consequence associated with each state s 2 S. The set of all possible acts is denoted F . An
act f 2 F is represented as a sequence of j = 1; : : : ; n pairs
f = (E1 : x1;    ; Ej : xj;    ; En : xn) ;
where xj is the consequence if event Ej occurs, i.e., xj is the outcome under each state s 2 Ej, and
(E1; : : : ; En) is a partition of the state space S. Acts, designating state-contingent consequences,
are assumed to be equipped with complete sign-ranking with respect to outcomes,
x1      xk 1  xk  xk+1      xn;
for some 1  k  n. That is, all consequences are ranked not only with respect to each other,
but also with respect to the neutral consequence xk, called the reference point.
13 Sometimes,
when the context is clear, the act f with a vector of outcomes (x1; : : : ; xn) is referred to as a
random variable, possibly without specied probabilities, and designated xj = f (sj) by fj.
10To simplify our exposition, whenever possible our results are proved in static discrete settings; however all
of the presented results can be applied to dynamic continuous settings.
11Following Wakker and Tversky (1993), Wakker (2010, Appendix G) and Kothiyal el al. (2011), the state
space, S, can consist of an innite number of states.
12Both sets S and X are assumed to be nonempty.
13It is common to assume that the reference point is the status quo, exogenously given. In the nancial
world, when consequences are returns rather than quantitative outcomes, a natural objective reference point
can possibly be 0 or the risk-free rate.
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All consequences x 2 X are interpreted either as a gain or as a loss with respect to the
designated reference point xk 2 X. Any consequence xj 2 X is a loss if xj  xk and a gain if
xk < xj. The cumulative events of loss and gain are, thus, dened by L = E1 [    [ Ek and
G = Ek+1 [    [ En, respectively. To shorten our notations the conventions EJ = E1 [    [ Ej
and EJ T = Ej [    [ Et are used to denote cumulative events.14
Capacities are the DM's subjective probabilities of cumulative events. A capacity Q is a
function on 2S assigning each event A  S with a number Q (A), satisfying Q (;) = 0, Q (S) = 1
and if A  B  S then 0  Q(A)  Q(B); that is, capacities are monotonic. The probability
of any loss event 1  j  k is dened by
 j = Q(E1 [    [ Ej) Q(E1 [    [ Ej 1)
and the probability of any gain event k + 1  j  n is dened by
+j = Q(Ej [    [ En) Q(Ej+1 [    [ En) ;
where E0 = En+1 = ;: It is important to note that the probabilities, , do not necessarily add
up to unity.15 Because Q () can be nonlinear,  need not be additive. That is, if A \ B = ;
usually Q (A [B) 6= Q(A) + Q (B).16
The domain of preference relation, %, is the nondegenerated set of acts F and the relations
, , s, -, and % are dened as usual. An act yielding the same consequence for any state
s 2 S is called a constant act and is designated by its constant consequence x 2 X. The
certainty equivalent (CE) of an act f 2 F is a constant act, x 2 F , such that f s x.
Let V be a real function V : F ! R assigning to each act f 2 F a value V (f) such that
V (f) =
kX
j=1
[Q (E1J) Q(E1J 1)] U (xj) +
nX
j=k+1
[Q (EJ N) Q(EJ+1N)] U (xj) ; (1)
where U : X ! R is a strictly increasing continuous utility function satisfying U (xk) = 0.
Similarly, the value of an act with an innite support is dened by17
V (f) =  
Z k
 1
Q
 
s 2 S  U(fs) < t	 dt+ Z 1
k
Q
 
s 2 S  U(fs) > t	 dt: (2)
Assume that the preference relation, %, on the set of actsF is truly mixed and satises: weak
ordering, monotonicity, continuity, gain-loss consistency, sign-tradeo consistency. Wakker
14Similarly, these notational conventions are applied to other variables, such as PJ = P(E1 [    [ Ej) and
PJT = P(Ej [    [ Et).
15To save on notations,  refers to both   and +.
16Similarly, capacities can be applied directly to consequences, without specifying an underlying state space,
i.e., Q (c  x  c), where c and c are constants; see Jaray (1989).
17Considering an innite support, notations are abused and k stands for xk.
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(2010, Theorem 12.3.5) proves that % can be represented by the real function V such that
V (f)  V (g) i f % g, for any f; g 2 F .18
Caution 2.1. To apply the Choquet integration,
R
S fdQ, over negative values it is assumed that
there exists a constant value C  jx1j such that gj = fj + C  0 for any event Ej 2  and the
integration, thus, takes the form
R
S gdQ  C.
The utility function, U (), characterizes the DM's preferences toward risk. A concave func-
tion implies risk aversion and a convex function implies risk loving. The utility function U ()
is unique up to an ane transformation and takes the form  U( x) for negative outcomes.
The concept of ambiguity aversion asserts that individuals are sensitive to probabilities.
Moreover, as subjective probabilities, Q, are shaped by the nonlinear ways in which individuals
process them they are nonadditive. The next section models the way individuals perceive
probabilities and the impact of ambiguity and attitude toward it on perceived probabilities.
2.3 The directing space
Probabilities over the subordinated space are assumed to be random and dominated by un-
observable events in a separate latent space, called a directing space. The meaning of shadow
probability arises from the randomness of probabilities themselves. While making her choice,
the DM does not know which event will be realized, either in the subordinated space or in
the directing space, which means that she knows neither the realized outcome nor the realized
probabilities of outcomes.
Objective probabilities P of events E 2  occurring in the subordinated space are random and
governed by directing events " in a (nite or innite) state space 
, called the directing space.
A directing event " = f!1; : : : ; !tg is a subset of 
, where !1; : : : ; !t 2 
 are directing states.
The set of directing events  is a -algebra of subsets of 
 and ("1; : : : ; "m) is a partition
of the directing space 
, i.e., "i \ "l = ;; 8i 6= l. A consequence of event "i is an additive
probability measure Pi over the subordinated space S, where Pi stands for P
   "i. P denotes
the set of consequential probability measures. In a nite subordinated space the probability
measure Pi takes the form of a probability vector Pi = (Pi;1; : : : ;Pi;j; : : : ;Pi;n), assigning to
each subordinated event its probability, where Pi;j stands for P
 Ej  "i.
A directing act, f^ , is a function from the directing space into the set of probability measures,
18Alternative axiomatizations that could be adopted are Tversky and Kahneman (1992), Wakker and Tversky
(1993), Chew and Wakker (1996) and Kothiyal et al. (2011).
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f^ : 
 ! P, describing the resulting probability measure associated with each directing state
! 2 
. The set of directing acts is denoted cF . For simplicity's sake, when possible, directing
acts are assumed to take a nite number of values. A directing act f^ 2 cF is dened by a
sequence i = 1; : : : ;m of pairs
f^ = ("1 : P1; : : : ; "i : Pi; : : : ; "m : Pm) ;
where Pi is the probability measure of event "i occuring. A directing act induces an event-wise
directing act which assigns each subordinated event Ej with its possible probabilities. That is,
f^j = ("1 : P1;j; : : : ; "i : Pi;j : : : ; "m : Pm;j) ;
where f^j stands for f^ (Ej). The set of event j's directing acts is denoted cFj. When the context
is clear, f^j is referred to as directing act and the index j designates the event. In this context,
f^j is simply considered as a random variable formulating the random probability of event Ej. A
constant directing act associates any directing event with the same probability measure P. A
subordinated act f associated with a constant directing act can be viewed as a roulette lottery,
i.e., all probabilities are perfectly known.
A second-order capacity (second-order probability)  () on 2
 assigns to each directing
event "  
 a number  ("), satisfying  (;) = 0,  (
) = 1, and if A  B  
 then
0   (A)   (B). It is important to note that  () need not be additive; However, to save on
notations and without loss of generality, it is considered to be additive such that
Pm
i=1 i = 1,
where i denotes  ("i). Figure 1 provides a diagrammatic representation of the two spaces:
the subordinated space and the directing space, and the relation between them.
Any subordinated act f 2 F is associated with a directing act f^ 2 cF . The DM's preferences
can be considered as if they are applied to pairs

f; f^

, i.e., preferences over a subset ofF cF .
However, as explained in the next section, decisions in our model are made in two separate
phases, such that these preference can be broken down into two independent preferences: %
over F and %2 over cF . We conclude this subsection by relating our model to a more Savage-
style structure. The objects of choice in Savage-type theory would be all measurable functions
from the product space S  
 to the outcome space X.19 Preferences over these objects of
choice (Savage-acts) are then taken as primitive in this framework.
19The product space can alternatively be dened by S P.
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Figure 1: The two spaces
3 Ambiguity
The main idea at the basis of our model is that risk and risk preferences apply to the subor-
dinated space, whereas ambiguity and preferences concerning it apply to the directing space.
The model assumes two dierentiated phases in the decision-making process: probability fram-
ing and valuation. In the framing phase, based on the information she has and her preferences
concerning ambiguity, the DM forms a representation of her subjective probabilities for all the
events which are relevant to her decision. Then, in the valuation phase, based on her preferences
concerning risk, the DM assesses the value of each act and chooses accordingly. Separating the
decision process to two sequential phases, where each phase is related to a dierent space,
allows us to distinguish between risk and ambiguity and between the preferences concerning
them. This section concentrates on the implications of the directing space for ambiguity and
preferences concerning it along the process of framing probabilities.
3.1 Attitudes toward ambiguity
The DM is assumed to have a (second-order) preference relation, %2, over the set of directing
acts, cF . Although the DM does not have a direct choice over directing acts, her subjective
perception of likelihoods, resulting from an aversion to or love of ambiguity, derives from the
nature of the directing acts. Directing acts are latent and cannot be chosen independently
of subordinated acts. As a result second-order preferences concerning the directing acts are
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unobservable. In some decision problems, however, second-order preferences can be inferred
from observable choices over acts in the subordinated space, for example, when the DM chooses
between two alternatives with identical subordinated acts but dierent directing acts.
It is important to emphasize that even though preferences with respect to the directing acts
are not observable they are not as unfamiliar as they might rst appear. For example, in the
Ellsberg urn experiment, directing acts may be considered as bets on the composition of the
urn. In portfolio investment in mean-variance space, directing acts can be viewed as bets on
the means, variances and covariances of the investment opportunities (see Izhakian (2011)).
Similarly, directing acts in model uncertainty applications can be considered as bets about the
true values of the parameters of the model.
Attitude toward ambiguity can be characterized by the DM's preferences over random prob-
abilities of events and their expected probabilities, i.e., preferences over directing acts and
constant directing acts. An ambiguity-averse DM prefers the expectations of the random prob-
abilities over the random probabilities themselves. An ambiguity-loving DM prefers the random
probabilities over their expectations and an ambiguity-neutral DM is indierent between them.
The next denition settles this idea formally.
Denition 3.1. Let a directing act be f^j = ("1 : P1;j; : : : ; "m : Pm;j) and its related constant
directing act be
^
fj = ("1 : E [Pj] ; : : : ; "m : E [Pj]) ; where E [Pj] =
Pm
i=1 iPi;j is the expected
probability of event Ej with respect to the second-order capacities . Ambiguity aversion (loving)
as regards event Ej is dened by ^fj %2 f^j ( ^fj -2 f^j) and ambiguity neutrality is dened by
^
fj s2 f^j.20
This denition focuses on preferences concerning ambiguity that related to single events.
Section 4 aggregates these preferences to preferences over entire acts. A DM is said to be
ambiguity averse if
^
fj %2 f^j for any Ej 2 . Ambiguity-loving DMs and ambiguity-neutral
DMs are dened similarly. Denition 3.1 can be applied to formulate dierent attitudes toward
ambiguity for dierent subsets of events; for example, ambiguity loving for losses and ambiguity
aversion for gains. Although it allows the exibility of DMs having dierent attitudes for
dierent events, it is assumed that the DM is consistent with respect to her attitudes toward
ambiguity and, thus, her attitude might vary only across events of gain and loss.
It is important to note that ambiguity and attitude toward it consider only the probabilities
and not consequences. The type and the magnitude of a consequence resulting from an event are
20Strict preferences toward ambiguity can be dened similarly.
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related neither to subjective preferences toward ambiguity nor to objective degree of ambiguity.
To illustrate this notion consider an event with unknown probability of losing $100. Changing
the magnitude of this loss to $10 or to $1000 does not have any eect on the degree of ambiguity.
The next theorem ties the DM's preferences concerning ambiguity to a functional represen-
tation.
Theorem 3.2. Let v : cFj ! R be a real function assigning a value v f^j to each directing
act f^j 2 cFj, such that
v

f^j

=
mX
i=1
[ ("1 [    [ "i)   ("1 [    [ "i 1)] (Pi;j) ;
where "0 = ; and  : [0; 1]! R is a strictly increasing continuous function.21 Assume that the
preference relation, %2, on the set of acts cFj satises: weak ordering, monotonicity, continuity
and sign-tradeo consistency. The preference %2 can then be represented by the function v,
such that v

f^j

 v (g^j) i f^j %2 g^j, for any f^j; g^j 2 cFj.
The proof of Theorem 3.2 is directly derived by Wakker (2010, Theorem 12.3.5).22 The func-
tion  (), referred to as a probability-sake (sake for short) function, forms the DM's attitude
toward ambiguity. Similarly to preferences concerning risk, there are three types of preferences
concerning ambiguity: ambiguity aversion, ambiguity loving and ambiguity neutrality. Ambi-
guity neutrality takes the form of a linear sake function  (), ambiguity aversion the form of a
concave sake function and ambiguity loving the form of a convex sake function.
Two special types of preferences concerning ambiguity can be dened. Constant relative
ambiguity aversion (CRAA), which takes the functional form  (P) = P
1 
1  , and constant ab-
solute ambiguity aversion (CAAA), which takes the functional form  (P) =   e P

, where  is
the coecient of ambiguity aversion. With this notion of ambiguity and preferences concerning
it, we suggest the following denition of subjective probabilities.
Model 3.3. The subjective probability Q(Ej) of any event Ej 2  is formed by23
Q(Ej) =   1
 
mX
i=1
 ("i) 
 
P
 Ej  "i! : (3)
It can be easily observed that, in fact, Equation (3) models the certainty equivalent, in terms
of probabilities, of the random probability of a subordinated event Ej. The subjective proba-
21This theorem provides the general form where capacities, , are nonadditive.
22Preferences %2 and their utility representation over the directing space are degenerated in the sense that
no distinction of losses from gains is made, such that true mixing and gain-loss consistency are not enforced.
23Considering a directing space with an innite support, subjective probabilities are formed in a manner
similar to Equation (2).
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bilities of an ambiguity-neutral DM are equal to the expected probabilities of each event, taken
with respect to the second-order probabilities, i.e., Q (Ej) = E [Pj]. Probabilities, in this case,
are additive and the certainty-equivalent probabilities are equal to the expected probabilities.
The subjective probabilities of an ambiguity-averse DM are lower than the expected probabili-
ties, i.e., Q (Ej) < E [Pj], which results in subadditive probabilities. The subjective probabilities
of an ambiguity-loving DM are greater than the expected probabilities, i.e., Q (Ej) > E [Pj],
which results in superadditive probabilities.
The subjective probabilities as formed by Model 3.3 provide a reason for the nonadditivity,
which is arbitrary in CEU and CPT. This result coincides with the nonadditive priors of Gilboa
(1987) and Schmeidler (1989). Recall that in shadow theory, before evaluating any subordinated
act f 2 F associated with the subordinated space, S, the DM's preferences over directing acts,cF , associated with the directing space, 
, serve to shape her subjective probabilities, Q,
assigned to each subordinated event Ej 2 . Formally, given the subjective probabilities of
Equation (3), they are integrated into Equation (1) to obtain the value of an act f .
Model 3.4. In shadow theory, the value of any act f 2 F with a nite support is
V (f) =
kX
j=1
"
  1
 
mX
i=1
i (Pi;1J)
!
    1
 
mX
i=1
i (Pi;1J 1)
!#
U(xj) +
nX
j=k+1
"
  1
 
mX
i=1
i (Pi;J N)
!
    1
 
mX
i=1
i (Pi;J+1N)
!#
U(xj) ;
and the value of any act with an innite support is
V (f) =  
Z k
 1
  1
 
mX
i=1
i 
 
Pi
 
s 2 S  U(f) < t	! dt
+
Z 1
k
  1
 
mX
i=1
i 
 
Pi
 
s 2 S  U(f) > t	! dt:
The functional representation of the DM's aggregate preferences, proposed by Model 3.4,
makes a complete distinction between beliefs and preferences and between risk and ambiguity.
First-order beliefs are formed by the random probability measures Pi=1;:::m; second-order beliefs
are formed by the probability measure ; preferences concerning risk are formed by the utility
function U (); and preferences concerning ambiguity are formed by the sake function  ().
The separation attained by Model 3.4 allows for isolating and studying the distinct impact of
each component on values of acts. However, even more important, it enables the simplication
of this model to an applicable form such that the degree of ambiguity can be measured, as
proposed later. This simplication paves the way for empirical studies to test the impact of
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ambiguity using the data.
Risk and ambiguity preferences, in Model 3.4, can be dierent for losses and for gains. Thus,
the functional representation for losses can take the form U () = U  () and  () =    (), and
for gains U () = U+ () and  () =  + (). Dierent utility functions, U  () and U+ (), can
capture, for example, loss aversion.24 Dierent sake functions,    () and  + (), can capture,
for example, ambiguity loving for losses and ambiguity aversion for gains.25 Pessimism and
optimism can also be incorporated into Model 3.4 by the distortions w  (Q) and w+ (Q) of
the subjective probabilities Q of losses and gains, respectively. Pessimism holds if worsening
the rank increases the weighting assigned by w (), i.e., bigger weights are assigned for worse
ranks.26 Optimism holds if improving the rank increases the weighting assigned by w (), i.e.,
bigger weights are assigned for better ranks. In principle, a DM in this extension can exhibit
ambiguity aversion while still having an optimistic perception of likelihoods.
3.2 Ambiguous probabilities
The goal of this section is to simplify Model 3.4 to a friendlier applicative form. Using this
simplied form, it is then proved that the ambiguity associated with an event can be measured
by the variance of its probability. For these purposes the following notations are introduced.
Let
pj = E [Pj] =
mX
i=1
iPi;j
be the expected probability of event Ej and
2j = Var [Pj] =
mX
i=1
i (Pi;j   pj)2
be its variance. The covariance of the probability of two events Ej and El is dened by
j;l = Cov [Pj;Pl] =
mX
i=1
i (Pi;j   pj) (Pi;l   pl) :
Now, to simplify the exposition of Model 3.4 and make it more applicable, subjective prob-
abilities, Q (), are approximated by taking a second-order Taylor approximation around their
expectations.27 Since this approximation deals with probabilities, a condition on the sake func-
24Loss aversion is modeled by a steeper utility function for losses than for gains (see, for example, Barberis
and Huang (2001)). Some behavioral studies report risk aversion for gains and risk seeking for losses (see, for
example, Wang and Fischbeck (2004) and Abdellaoui et al. (2008)).
25Some behavioral study document ambiguity loving for losses and ambiguity aversion for gains (see, for
example, Dobbs (1991) and Bier and Connell (1994)).
26To simplify notation, the weighting function w is used in reference to both w  and w+.
27The same method is applied by Arrow (1965) and Pratt (1964) to outcomes within the expected utility
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tion  () is enforced to assure that the approximated subjective probabilities are nonnegative.
Theorem 3.5. Assume a continuous twice-dierentiable sake function  (), satisfying
1
2

 00 (pl)
 0 (pl)
2l  
 00 (pj[l)
 0 (pj[l)
2j[l

 pj; (4)
for any events Ej; El 2 , where j [ l stands for Ej [ El. The subjective probability of event Ej
is then
Q(Ej) t pj + 1
2
 00 (pj)
 0 (pj)
2j :
Similarly, the subjective probability of a cumulative event EJ T = Ej[  [Et is Q (EJ T ) t
pJ T + 12
 00(pJT )
 0(pJT )
2J T : Theorem 3.5 characterizes the DM's capacities, which satisfy Q (;) = 0
and Q (S) = 1. Lemma A.1 proves that if A  B  S then Q (A)  Q(B) and, thus,
Q () is a capacity. Condition (4) implies that the coecient of ambiguity aversion,   00()
 0() , is
bounded, such that  2 pj
2j
   00(pj)
 0(pj)
 2 pj
2j
and  2 pj
2j+2j;l
   00(pj)
 0(pj)
 2 pj
2j+2j;l
. It restricts the
level of ambiguity aversion (the concavity of  ) such that the marginal probability premium
(dened below) of an event must be lower than the marginal expected probability of that
event. This condition assures that the approximated probability, Q (), is nonnegative and that
the probability of an event is not lower than the probability of any of its sub-events. This
condition, however, is required only for the purpose of approximation and it is not enforced
over the precise subjective probabilities dened in Equation (3). Henceforth it is assumed that
the sake function  () falls under Condition (4).
The following denition establishes a new terminology.
Denition 3.6. The expression
'j =  1
2
 00 (pj)
 0 (pj)
2j
is referred to as the probability premium of event Ej and 2j is referred to as the ambiguity
of event j (e-ambiguity for short). The expression   00(pj)
 0(pj)
is referred to as the coecient of
absolute ambiguity aversion and  pj  
00(pj)
 0(pj)
is referred to as the coecient of relative ambiguity
aversion.28
The probability premium is composed of two components: the DM's preferences concerning
ambiguity, framed by   00()
 0() , and the degree of e-ambiguity, measured by 
2. Preferences
framework, whereas in this case it is applied to consequential probabilities. The method is restricted to the
case of small consequences, ant is applicable in the current model since consequences are probabilities ranging
between 0 and 1.
28These denitions are equivalent to the Arrow-Pratt coecient of absolute risk aversion and coecient of
relative risk aversion, respectively.
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concerning ambiguity can be aversion (  00()
 0() > 0) loving (  
00()
 0() < 0) or neutrality (  
00()
 0() =
0). Clearly a higher ambiguity aversion or a higher degree of e-ambiguity implies a greater
probability premium and a lower subjective probability. When the probability of an event is
perfectly known, its e-ambiguity is zero, i.e, 2 = 0, and thus is the probability premium.
When the DM is ambiguity neutral then   00()
 0() = 0, which also implies a zero probability
premium. Subadditive probabilities are obtained when the DM exhibits ambiguity aversion,
i.e.,  
00()
 0() < 0, and superadditive probabilities when she exhibits ambiguity loving, i.e.,
 00()
 0() > 0.
It is important to note that by Condition (4) the coecient of absolute ambiguity aversion is
bounded, such that for a high enough level of ambiguity aversion the subjective probability of
each event tends to zero.
In general, the subjective probability measure, Q (), is nonadditive, that is
Q (E1 [    [ Et [ Et+1 [    [ Ej) 6= Q(E1 [    [ Et) + Q (Et+1 [    [ Ej) :
This measure has an additive component, the expected probability
p (E1 [    [ Et [ Et+1 [    [ Ej) = p (E1 [    [ Et) + p (Et+1 [    [ Ej) ;
with an additional nonadditive component, the probability premium. The source of nonaddi-
tivity is the e-ambiguity, measured by 21j, which in most cases satises
21J 6= 21T 1 + 2T J :
The ambiguities of two events (e-ambiguities) are not independent.29 Nonadditivity is caused
by the correlation between the probabilities of events. Since e-ambiguity is the variance of
the possible probabilities of the event, the e-ambiguity of a union of events comprises the
covariances between the probabilities of its sub-events. For example, the e-ambiguity of a
union of two events is the sum of the e-ambiguity of each event, plus twice the covariance
between the probabilities of these events, as the next proposition proves.
Proposition 3.7. For any 1 < t < j  n, e-ambiguity satises
21J = 
2
1T + 
2
T+1J + 21T;T+1J :
A special case of e-ambiguity arises when considering an event E and its complement event
Ec, since the e-ambiguity of their union equals zero, i.e., 2S = 0: The next lemma applies to
this case.
29One can write  (Ej ; El) = 12

 00(pj[l)
 0(pj[l)
2j[l    
00(pl)
 0(pl)
2l    
00(pj)
 0(pj)
2j

to obtain the Mobius transform of two
events (see, for example, Chateauneuf and Jaray (1989) and Grabisch et al. (2000)).
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Lemma 3.8. The covariance between the probability of event E 2  and the probability of its
complement event Ec 2  satises
Cov [P (E) ;P (Ec)] =  Var [P (E)] =  Var [P (Ec)] ;
and thus 2S = 0.
The results of Proposition 3.7 and Lemma 3.8 coincide with the ndings of support the-
ory of Tversky and Koehler (1994) and Rottenstreich and Tversky (1997). Support theory
demonstrates that the judged probability of an event generally increases when its description is
unpacked into disjoint components and decreases by unpacking the alternative description. One
can easily conclude from Proposition 3.7 that, when 1T;T+1J < 0 and DMs are ambiguity
averse, unpacking an event into disjoint components increases its probability. The conclusion
arising from the behavioral ndings of support theory is that the probabilities of events in the
same state space are negatively correlated.
Now that we have studied some essential properties of e-ambiguity, Model 3.4 can be sim-
plied such that the value of an act f takes the form
V (f) =
kX
j=1
[pj   '1J + '1J 1] U (xj) +
nX
j=k+1
[pj   'J N + 'J+1N ] U (xj) ; (5)
where 'J T =  12  
00(pJT )
 0(pJT )
2J T . Recall that attitude toward ambiguity can be dierent for
gains and for losses. Thus, the coecient of ambiguity attitude can take the form   00L(p1J )
 0L(p1J )
for any loss event 1  j  k and   00G(p1J )
 0G(p1J )
for any gain event k + 1  j  n.
Example 3.9. Assume an ambiguity-averse DM who exhibits CAAA. Since p is additive and
  00()
 0() = , one can verify that the value of an act f in Equation (5) is simplied to
V (f) =
nX
j=1
pjU(xj)  1
2

kX
j=1

21J   21J 1

U(xj)  1
2

nX
j=k+1

2J N   2J+1N

U(xj) :
The rst component of the value function is the conventional expected utility. The last two
components are the disutility caused to an ambiguity-averse DM by the presence of ambiguity.
If the DM's preferences toward ambiguity are CRAA, then the value of an act f is
V (f) =
nX
j=1
pjU(xj)  1
2

kX
j=1

21J
p1J
  
2
1J 1
p1J 1

U(xj)  1
2

nX
j=k+1

2J N
pJ N
  
2
J+1N
pJ+1N

U(xj) :
In both cases, if the DM is ambiguity neutral, no disutility occurs and V (f) =
Pn
j=1 pjU(xj).
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4 Ambiguity measurement
Almost any real-life decision is concerned with ambiguity. For example, what are the chances
that a date will be successful? Which job opportunity is more likely to yield the best result
for career growth? Or which investment approach is more promising for long term gain? An
important part of any decision process is rst to rank the dierent alternatives by their degree
of ambiguity. The key point for addressing this need is to determine a well-dened measure of
ambiguity. The main goal of this section is to provide such a measure.
4.1 Ordering ambiguous events
A preliminary step in ordering acts by their degree of ambiguity is to dene an order over
primitive events. This order, induced by the DM's preferences, is dened as follows.
Denition 4.1. Let the random probabilities of events Ej; El  S, having the same expected
probability, i.e., pj = pl, be f^j and f^l, respectively. Event Ej is more ambiguous than event El
if f^l %2 f^j by any ambiguity-averse DM.
Denition 4.1 provides the subjective ordering that emerges from the DM's preferences. An
objective ordering can be dened as follows.30
Denition 4.2. Event Ej  S is more ambiguous than event El  S if there exists a random
variable  such that
Pj   pj =d Pl   pl +   0;
where =d means equal in distribution and E


 Pl = E [] = 0.31
The subjective ordering of Denition 4.1 coincides with the objective ordering of Denition
4.2, as the following proposition proves.
Proposition 4.3. Given two events Ej; El  S having the same expected probability, Denitions
4.1 and 4.2 of more ambiguous events are equivalent.
Events can also be ordered by their degree of ambiguity, measured by 2.
Denition 4.4. Let Ej; El  S. Event Ej is more ambiguous than event El if 2j  2l .
Denition 4.4 states that the higher the uctuation of probability of an event is the greater
its e-ambiguity. Ordering events by 2 coincides with the ordering of Denitions 4.1 and 4.2 if
probabilities are equably symmetrically distributed or if the DM's preferences toward ambiguity
30Rothschild and Stiglitz (1970) apply a similar idea for risk, with respect to outcomes.
31The condition E


 Pl = E [] means that  is mean-independent of Pl, i.e., a mean-preserving spread.
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are quadratic or of the CAAA type. Formally, the probability of event Ej is said to be equably
symmetrically distributed if it satises Ps+i+1;j Ps+i;j =  and s i = s+i, 8i =  s; : : : ; s,
where s is the point of symmetry.
Proposition 4.5. Given two events Ej; El  S having the same expected probability, Denition
4.4 is equivalent to Denitions 4.1 and 4.2 if one of the following conditions holds:
(i) The probabilities of Ej and El are equably symmetrically distributed;
(ii) The DM's preferences toward ambiguity are of the CAAA type;
(iii) The DM's preferences toward ambiguity are quadratic.
Henceforth, it is assumed that the probabilities of all events are equably symmetrically
distributed. If needed, at any point this assumption can be replaced by assuming CAAA or a
quadratic sake function. At this point the order of events by e-ambiguity is well dened. This
order induces only a partial order on the set of acts F . E-ambiguity induces a total order on
subsets of F satisfying the following condition.
Denition 4.6. Let the acts f; g 2 F , whose probabilities are equably symmetrically dis-
tributed, have the same expected probabilities. Act f is more ambiguous than act g if for any
event E  S, any ambiguity-averse DM g^ (E) %2 f^ (E).
Assuming aversion to ambiguity, Denition 4.6 states that if for any event the random
probability associated with act g is preferred to the random probability associated with act f ,
then f is more ambiguous than g. This denition together with Proposition 4.5 implies that if
for any subset of states E  S the e-ambiguity of g is not higher than the e-ambiguity of f , i.e.,
2f;E  2g;E , then f is more ambiguous than g.32 In other words, the idea of Denition 4.6 is
that act f is more ambiguous than act g if the probabilities associated with it are consistently
more volatile than the probabilities associated with act g.
Practically, Denition 4.6 formulates rst-order stochastic dominance with respect to ambi-
guity. This denition can be rephrased as follows: act f is stochastically dominated by act g
with respect to ambiguity. Figure 2 illustrates two acts, where f is stochastically dominated
by g. The values on the y-axis are the degrees of ambiguity of the cumulative events lying on
the x-axis. Recall that the degree of ambiguity of the entire state space is always zero. Thus,
both acts have a zero degree of ambiguity for the empty event, ;, and the state space, S.
32The notations pf;j and 
2
f;j stand for the expected probability and the e-ambiguity of event Ej under act f .
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Figure 2: First order stochastic dominance with respect to ambiguity
4.2 The ambiguity measure
The ambiguity measure introduced in this section considers symmetric acts. Formally, an act
f is said to be a symmetric act around the point of symmetry xs if its probabilities are
equably symmetrically distributed and it satises xs   xs j = xs+j   xs and Pi;s j = Pi;s+j,
8j =  s; : : : s and 8i = 1; : : :m. For measuring ambiguity, the more restrictive assumption
of normally distributed outcomes, which allows measuring risk by variance, can be relaxed
to symmetric distribution. The measure of ambiguity proposed in this section utilizes the
cumulative probability of loss and the cumulative probability of gain. It relies on Lemma 3.8,
which implies that the variance of the cumulative probability of loss is equal to the variance
of the cumulative probability of gain, that is, Var [PL] = Var [PG]. The next model proposes
one of the main results of this paper: a new measure of ambiguity. It asserts that the degree
of ambiguity embedded in an act can be measured by twice the sum of the variance of its
cumulative probability of loss and the variance of its cumulative probability of gain.
Model 4.7. The degree of ambiguity of act f 2 F , denoted f2, can be measured by
f2 [f ] = 2Var [PL] + 2Var [PG] = 4Var [PL] : (6)
The normalized, to the units of probability, measure is dened by
f [f ] = 2
p
Var [PL]: (7)
The measure of ambiguity, f2, allows for ordering acts that satisfy rst-order stochastic
dominance with respect to ambiguity. Theorem 4.8 below proves that, indeed, ordering ac-
cording to f2 coincides with the ordering provided by an ambiguity-averse DM. The ambiguity
measure, f2, is inspired by the insight that a probability's uctuation should be measured
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relative to a meaningful reference point. Since decisions are concerned with potential loss, with
a non-zero probability (truly mixed), the natural reference point is the consequence which dis-
tinguishes losses from gains. While making choices, this consequence is signicant to the DM,
who is concerned about the perturbation of probabilities of loss and gain.
The minimal possible degree of ambiguity, f2 = 0, is obtained when all probabilities are
perfectly known. The maximal possible degree of ambiguity, f2 = 1, is obtained when the
probability of loss (or gain) is either 0 or 1 with equal odds. In this most extreme case,
the variance of the probability of loss attains its maximal possible value, 1
4
. Variances of
probabilities are therefore normalized by 4 to provide an ambiguity measure ranging between
0 and 1. Notice that f2 depends on a reference point, xk, which determines the set of gain
consequences and the set of loss consequences. If xk = x1 or xk = xn, i.e., outcomes are
considered either all as gain or all as loss, then the degree of ambiguity equals zero.33
If there is a reference point agreed upon by all DMs, which makes a clear distinction between
losses and gains, the ambiguity measure f2 can be considered an objective measure of ambiguity;
otherwise it is considered a subjective measure. Concerning nancial assets, for example, the
risk-free rate of return can possibly be an objective reference point agreed upon by all nancial
DMs.
The measure of ambiguity, f2, also takes into account the impact of the correlations between
probabilities, across-events. One can dene an absolute measure of ambiguity as follow. The
absolute degree of ambiguity of act f can be measured by34
bf2 [f ] = 4 nX
j=1
Var [Pj] : (8)
Great caution should be exercised when using bf2; by denition probabilities are almost always
correlated, such that bf2 is biased in the sense that it ignores these correlations. In other words,
this measure disregards an important item of information concerning the nature of probabilities
and as a result also the nature of ambiguity.
The point to emphasize is that the measure of ambiguity f2 is not inuenced by the mag-
nitude of outcomes in general and the magnitude of loss or gain in particular. Increasing or
decreasing the outcomes of an act does not change its degree of ambiguity, but it does change
its degree of risk. A decision-making process considers not only the degree of ambiguity but
33These are the only two cases in which acts are not truly mixed.
34One may consider
Pk
j=1

p1J21J   p1J 121J 1

+
Pn
j=k+1

pJN2JN   pj+1N2j+1N

as relative
measure of ambiguity (with respect to expected probabilities).
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also the degree of risk. Hence, when making choices these two factors together play a role. A
consolidated uncertainty measure, which aggregates risk and ambiguity, can be dened by
U (f) = Var [f ]
1  f2 [f ] ;
see Izhakian (2012).
Taking the rst part of the Ellsberg experiment as an example, the probability of drawing
a black (B) ball can be one of the possible values 0
90
; 1
90
; 2
90
; : : : ; 60
90
. The DM, who doesn't have
any additional information regarding which probability is more likely, assigns an equal weight
to each alternative. Considering only strictly positive outcomes as a gain ($9 in this case), the
normalized degree of ambiguity (to units of probability) of this bet is f [B] = 0:3912. In the
second part of the experiment, when betting on red or yellow (RY ), the probability of gain can
be one of the possible values 30
90
; 31
90
; : : : 90
90
, which implies that the degree of ambiguity is also
f [RY ] = 0:3912. Table 2 is a stylized description of this example, where E [x] and Var [x] are
computed using expected probabilities.
R Y B PG E [PG] E [x] Var [x] f
(R) 9 0 0 13
1
3 3 18 0
(B) 0 0 9 090 ;
1
90 ;
2
90 ; : : : ;
60
90
1
3 3 18 0:3912
(RY ) 9 9 0 3090 ;
31
90 ;
32
90 ; : : : ;
90
90
2
3 6 18 0:3912
(BY ) 0 9 9 23
2
3 6 18 0
Table 2: The Ellsberg example
Assume now that instead of 60 black and yellow balls in an unknown proportion, the urn
contains only 30 black and yellow balls in an unknown proportion in addition to 30 red balls.
The degree of ambiguity of the bet on B decreases to f [B] = 0:2981. If the amount of balls
which may be black or yellow in an unknown proportion is 90, then the degree of ambiguity
of the bet on B increases to f [B] = 0:4377. If the urn contains only 60 balls, all of them
black or yellow in an unknown proportion, then the degree of ambiguity, which in this case is
identical for black and yellow, is f = 0:5868. If there are only 10 balls in the urn (and again the
proportion of black and yellow is unknown), then f = 0:6324. Finally, if there is only one ball
in the urn, of unknown color, then f = 1, and in the other extreme case if there is an innite
number of balls in the urn, then f = 1p
12
. Table 3 is a stylized description of these variations.
To prove that f2 measures ambiguity, it has to be shown that indeed, given two acts with an
identical expected outcome and an identical degree of risk, an ambiguity-averse DM prefers the
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#balls R Y B PG f [B]
90 30 0; : : : ; 60, 0; : : : ; 60 090 ;
1
90 ; : : :
60
90 0:3912
60 30 0; : : : ; 30 0; : : : ; 30 060 ;
1
60 ; : : :
30
60 0:2981
120 30 0; : : : ; 90 0; : : : ; 90 0120 ;
1
120 ; : : :
90
120 0:4377
1 0 0 : : :1 0 : : :1 0 : : : 1 0:2886
60 0 0; : : : ; 60 0; : : : ; 60 060 ;
1
60 ; : : :
60
60 0:5868
10 0 0; : : : ; 10 0; : : : ; 10 010 ;
1
10 ; : : :
10
10 0:6324
1 0 0; : : : ; 1 0; 1 0; 1 1
Table 3: Degrees of ambiguity
act with the lower f2. The next theorem ties f2 to the DM's preferences concerning ambiguity.
To dierentiate the impact of ambiguity, the ordering is made over acts with identical properties
except for the degree of ambiguity. That is, the acts have the same set of outcomes and the
same expected probability for each outcome, such that the only dierence between them is the
dispersion of probabilities around their expected probabilities, for each event. To eliminate the
impact of preferences concerning risk, the DM is assumed to be risk neutral. Since acts are
assumed to be symmetric, with a point of symmetry xs equal to the expected outcome, it is
assumed that the reference point satises xk  xs; otherwise, the DM will not consider these
acts.
Theorem 4.8. Assume symmetric acts f; g 2 F , satisfying rst-order stochastic dominance
with respect to ambiguity, sharing the same set of outcomes, X, and having the same expected
probability for each outcome, i.e., E [P (fj)] = E [P (gj)], 8j = 1; : : : ; n.35 Act f is more am-
biguous than act g, i.e., f2 [g]  f2 [f ], i any ambiguity-averse DM, with a reference point
xk  xs, prefers g to f .
Theorem 4.8 proves that if two acts are identical except in their degree of ambiguity any
ambiguity-averse DM prefers the act with the lower f2 over the act with the higher f2, which
implies that ordering acts by f2 is identical to the ordering provided by a DM who exhibits
aversion to ambiguity.
35Here, f and g are referred to as random variables; thus, the index j designates outcome rather than event.
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5 Implementation for asset pricing
The main advantage of shadow theory, implemented by Model 3.4, is that it achieves a complete
separation of ambiguity from risk and beliefs from preferences. To demonstrate this merit, this
section presents an application of the theory to asset pricing. The prices that investors are
willing to pay for assets might be aected by the fact that they do not know the precise
probabilities of returns. They might require an additional premium, in terms of return, for
bearing ambiguity in addition to the premium they require for bearing risk. This section
models these two premiums, the risk premium and the ambiguity premium, in separated closed
forms. The empirical tests of this model conducted by Brenner and Izhakian (2011) are then
described.
5.1 The ambiguity premium
The risk premium is the premium that a DM is willing to pay for replacing a risky bet with
its expected outcome. The ambiguity premium is the premium that a DM is willing to pay for
replacing an ambiguous bet with a risky but non-ambiguous bet having an identical expected
outcome. The uncertainty premium is the total premium that a DM is willing to pay for
replacing an ambiguous bet with its expected outcome, i.e., the accumulation of risk premium
and ambiguity premium. Formally, the uncertainty premium, denoted K, is dened by
U (E [x] K) =
kX
j=1
[pj   ('1J   '1J 1)] U (xj) +
nX
j=k+1
[pj   ('jN   'J+1N)] U (xj) : (9)
The certainty equivalent, CE = E [x] K, of an act f 2 F is a constant act CE 2 F satisfying
V (CE) = V (f). In other words, the certainty equivalent is the constant act for which the DM
is willing to exchange a risky ambiguous (uncertain) act. The next theorem approximates this
premium and separates it into risk premium and ambiguity premium.
Theorem 5.1. Assume a DM whose reference point xk is relatively close to zero, satisfying
0  xk  E [x], and her preferences are characterized by a twice-dierentiable utility function,
U(), and a twice-dierentiable sake function,  (). The uncertainty premium is then
K t  1
2
U00 (E [x])
U0 (E [x])
Var [x]| {z }
R
 1
8

 00 (E [PL])
 0 (E [PL])
+
 00 (E [PG])
 0 (E [PG])

E [x]f2 [x]| {z }
A
; (10)
where R is the risk premium and A is the ambiguity premium.36
36The proof of Theorem 5.1 applies the same method as that of Arrow (1965) and Pratt (1964), while outcomes
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Concerning nancial decisions, outcomes can possibly be rates of return, r. In this case, the
uncertainty premium, in terms of return, takes the form
K t  1
2
U00 (E [r])
U0 (E [r])
Var [r]  1
8

 00 (E [PL])
 0 (E [PL])
+
 00 (E [PG])
 0 (E [PG])

f2 [r] : (11)
Theorem 5.1 provides a complete distinction in two aspects. First, it distinguishes between
risk premium and ambiguity premium, such that these two premiums are orthogonal. Second,
within each premium, it distinguishes between sources of premiums, i.e., preference and beliefs.
The risk premium, R t  1
2
U00(E[r])
U0(E[r])Var [r], is the Arrow-Pratt risk premium. Independently,
a higher risk, measured by Var [r], or higher risk aversion, measured by the coecient of absolute
risk aversion,  U00()
U0() , both result in a higher risk premium. The degree of risk, Var [r], is a matter
of the DM's beliefs, while risk aversion is a matter of her preferences concerning it.
The ambiguity premium, A t  1
8
h
 00(E[PL])
 0(E[PL])
+  
00(E[PG])
 0(E[PG])
i
f2 [r], possesses attributes resem-
bling those of the risk premium, but with respect probabilities rather than to consequences.
A complete separation between beliefs about random probabilities, measured by f2, and pref-
erences concerning it, measured by the coecient of absolute ambiguity aversion,   00()
 0() , is
achieved. Ambiguity aversion implies a positive ambiguity premium, since   00()
 0() > 0. Am-
biguity loving implies a negative ambiguity premium, since   00()
 0() < 0. Ambiguity neutrality
implies a zero ambiguity, since   00()
 0() = 0. A zero ambiguity premium is also obtained when
probabilities are perfectly known, i.e., f2 = 0. Independently, a higher degree of ambiguity or
a higher aversion to it, both increase the ambiguity premium.
As an example, the next corollary shows the dierent premiums in the case of a DM typied
by constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) and constant absolute ambiguity aversion (CAAA).
Corollary 5.2. Assuming a DM who is characterized by CRRA,37
U(xj) =
8<:
x1 j  x1 k
1  ;  6= 0
ln (xj)  ln (xk) ;  = 0
;
and CAAA,
 (Pi) =  e
 Pi

;
then the uncertainty premium is
K t  1
2
Var [r]| {z }
R
+ 
1
4
E [r]f2 [r]| {z }
A
:
are also restricted to be relatively small.
37A more standard formulation of CRRA, U (x) = x
1 
1  for  6= 1 and U (x) = ln (x) for  = 1 otherwise, is
not always normalized to U (xk) = 0.
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When the expected probabilities of loss and gain are relatively close to 1
2
, the ambiguity
premium can be simplied to
A t  1
4
 00 (E [PL])
 0 (E [PL])
f2 [r] ;
and the expected return (equity premium) is thus
E [r] t rf   1
2
U00 (E [r])
U0 (E [r])
Var [r]  1
4
 00 (E [PL])
 0 (E [PL])
f2 [r] ; (12)
where rf stands for the risk-free rate of return. Brenner and Izhakian (2011) test this equation
empirically as described next.
5.2 Empirical results
To demonstrate the empirical aspects of shadow theory and its explanatory power, this section
reviews the results of Brenner and Izhakian (2011). Their study employs the ambiguity measure,
f2, as an explanatory factor of the aggregate return on the stock market. They assume a
pricing representative investor, whose reference point is the risk-free rate. The return on the
stock market is assumed to be normally distributed, but the parameters, mean and variance,
governing its distribution are assumed to be random.
Using the S&P 500 intraday data, Brenner and Izhakian (2011) extract the monthly degree
of ambiguity by utilizing the following four-step methodology. The rst step is sampling 20
to 22 groups, each comprising 27 observations (15-minutes returns) from the monthly data. A
group can be selected randomly or can simply be the observation of a specic day in the month.
The second step is computing the mean and variance of each group. Assuming that returns
are normally distributed, the third step is computing the probability of a negative return (loss)
for each group, using its mean and variance. At this point, for each month there are 20-22
probabilities of loss. The last step is computing the variance of these probabilities to obtain
the monthly degree of ambiguity f2.
Employing the degree of ambiguity, Brenner and Izhakian (2011) conduct a series of tests
to study its explanatory power on the stock market's return and its relationships with other
risk factors. They show that ambiguity has a signicantly negative impact on returns in both
contemporaneous and prediction testing, which means that monthly return on the stock market
is not only negatively aected by the ambiguity in the same month but also by the ambiguity
in the previous month. These results indicate that typically investors in the stock market are
ambiguity loving.
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6 Related Literature
Since the seminal works of Knight (1921) and Ellsberg (1961), utility theory research has been
making a concerted eort to treat decision processes under uncertainty and explain the violation
of expected utility theory. This eort has generated the ideas that, in the presence of ambiguity,
the DM's belief takes the form either of multiple priors or of a single but non-additive prior. In
their max-min expected utility with multiple priors (MEU) model, Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989)
assert that an ambiguity-averse DM possesses a set of priors and evaluates her ex-ante welfare
conditional upon the worst prior. The subjective nonadditive probabilities of Gilboa (1987) and
the Choquet expected utility (CEU) of Schmeidler (1989) state that uncertainty and aversion to
it can be represented by a single subadditive prior (capacity). Tversky and Kahneman's (1992)
CPT implements a two-sided variant of CEU with dierent capacities for gains and for losses.
Shadow theory's contribution to this literature is threefold. First, it achieves a complete
separation between ambiguity and attitude toward it. Second, it provides a bridge between the
MEU discipline and the CEU and CPT disciplines. Third, it proves that capacities are not ar-
bitrary and can be explained by the presence of ambiguity and the DM's preferences concerning
it. Capacities, in shadow theory, emerge from the randomness of probability distribution and
the nonlinear ways in which individuals may perceive these probabilities. This randomness can
be viewed as a random selection, dominated by a second-order prior, of one prior from a set of
priors.
The concept of modeling attitudes toward ambiguity by relaxing the reduction between
rst-order and second-order probabilities, suggested by Segal (1987), inspires other models:
Klibano et al.'s (2005) smooth model of ambiguity, its recursive form, also proposed by
Klibano et al. (2009), its generalization to include intertemporal substitution, proposed by
Ju and Miao (2011) and Hayashi and Miao (2011), and the second-order probability sophis-
tication of Nau (2006), Chew and Sagi (2008) and Ergin and Gul (2009). Unlike our model,
in these model preferences toward ambiguity are taken with respect to expected utilities or
certainty equivalents, so that a complete distinction between the impact of risk preferences and
the impact of ambiguity preferences on decisions is not trivial. Applying preferences concerning
ambiguity to probabilities, our model achieves a complete distinction between the eects of risk
preferences and the eects of ambiguity preferences.
Shadow theory can be interpreted as a model of robustness in the presence of model uncer-
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tainty. This class of models assumes an uncertainty about the true probability law governing
the realization of states, and a DM, with her concerns about misclassication, looks for robust
decision making; see, for example, Hansen and Sragent (2001), Maccheroni et al. (2006) and
Hansen and Sargent (2007). Generally speaking, ambiguity in this line of models is formulated
by the deviation of probability from a reference probability (reference model), measured by
relative entropy.38 Shadow theory relaxes the requirement of having a reference model and
required only a reference point, which is easier to identify.
Shadow theory is also related to Siniscalchi's (2009) vector expected utility, which assumes a
baseline probability and dierent sources of ambiguity with respect to expected utility. Other
models that consider reference expected utility include those of Roberts (1980), Quiggin et
al.(2004) and Grant and Polak (2007), for example, or consider a reference prior (Einhorn and
Hogarth (1986), and Gajdos et al. (2008), for example). Kopylov's (2006) -contamination
suggests the addition of an element of condence to the generated set of priors. Chateauneuf et
al. (2007) suggest new capacities (neo-additives) obtained from an -max-min expected utility
with a set of priors generated by -contamination. All these models require the identication
of a reference prior, which practically is not a simple task, if it is possible at all.
In some sense shadow theory can be viewed as a special case of the phantom probability
framework suggested by Izhakian and Izhakian (2009a) and its implementation to decision
theory by Izhakian and Izhakian (2009b), where the authors suggest that observable real out-
comes and real probabilities are projections of consequences in a generalized multidimensional
space called phantom space. The norm over this space, which maps phantom probabilities to
real probabilities, can be considered as derived by preferences concerning ambiguity, which is
equivalent to the sake function in shadow theory.
This is the point to emphasize. Shadow theory diers from all of the models mentioned
above in one major aspect: ambiguity is applied directly to probabilities and not to any element
of utility. That is, it is not applied to expected utility, certainty equivalent or event-wise utility,
which are driven by preference concerning risk. In shadow theory no need arises to identify
a reference probability distribution. It provides a formal way to compare the choices of two
DMs who have dierent attitudes toward ambiguity, or dierent degrees of ambiguity; for
example, two DMs who share the same information and the same attitude toward risk but
have dierent levels of ambiguity sensitivity, or two DMs who share the same attitude toward
38Relative entropy is the expected log Radon-Nikodym derivative. Technically, all alternative models have to
be absolutely continuous with respect to the reference model for an entropy measure to exist.
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risk and ambiguity but possess dierent information (dierent degrees of ambiguity). The
ability to conduct this type of comparative static is of primary importance, as it allows for the
identication of the pure eect of introducing ambiguity and attitude toward it into a model.
The behavioral decision literature documents dierent preferences concerning ambiguity
when facing gains, as compared to facing losses: the preferences are usually ambiguity aversion
for gains and ambiguity loving for losses (see, for example, Einhorn and Hogarth (1986), Ho
et al. (2009) and Chakravarty and Roy (2009)). Our model supports dierent preferences
for ambiguity for losses and gains. Interestingly, overcondence is also linked to ambiguity.
Brenner et al. (2011) show that when exposed to ambiguity individuals are less overcondent
about the likelihood of outperforming a benchmark portfolio. In terms of shadow theory, these
results imply that individuals assign lower subjective probabilities of gain when exposed to a
higher degree of ambiguity. Practically, their results provide experimental evidence supporting
our model.
Several approaches to estimating ambiguity have been suggested in the literature. Dow
and Werlang (1992) measure uncertainty as the sum of the probability of an event and the
probability of its complement event. Assuming a normal distribution with an unknown mean,
Ui (2011) measures ambiguity by the dierence between the minimal possible mean and the
true mean. Assuming a second-order belief, Maccheroni et al. (2011) measure ambiguity by
the variance of an unknown mean. Assuming a multiple-prior setting, Bewley (2011) measures
ambiguity by a critical condence interval. Assuming mean-variance preferences, with known
variance and unknown mean, Boyle et al. (2011) also measure ambiguity using the condence
interval  =
n
 : ( ^)
2
2^
 2
o
; where ^ is the estimated value of the excess mean return, ,
and ^ is its standard error. All these studies assume that the variance of consequences is
known. Our measure of ambiguity, f2, is broader; it assumes an unknown variance and allows
all other parameters that characterize probabilities to be unknown.
In their empirical analysis, Anderson et al. (2009) and Drechsler (2011) proxy for uncer-
tainty via the degree of disagreement of professional forecasters, attributing dierent weights
to each forecaster. Jewitt and Mukerji (2011) investigate the ranking of ambiguous acts as
revealed by the DM's preferences. These methods can be classied as subjective ordering by
ambiguity, while f2 can be considered as providing an objective ordering.
The implications of ambiguity regarding the equity premium have been studied mainly by
focusing on the theoretical aspects. Izhakian and Benninga (2011) add an ambiguity premium
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to the conventional risk premium and show that increasing risk aversion might result in a
lower uncertainty premium. Maccheroni et al. (2011) adjust the mean-variance model for
ambiguity and extract the ambiguity premium. Ui (2011) proves that, due to changes in
market participation, changes in risk premium and changes in ambiguity premium may have
opposite signs. Epstein and Schneider (2008) employ the max-min model to show that the
ambiguity premium depends on the idiosyncratic risk in fundamentals.39 Unlike Theorem 5.1,
in these papers a complete separation between preferences and beliefs and between risk and
ambiguity is not obtained.
7 Conclusion
In reality almost any decision involves ambiguity. It is only too natural to look for a simple
measure of ambiguity that allows for ordering uncertain alternatives by their degree of ambigu-
ity. The current paper satises this need by providing an ambiguity measure which can easily
be employed in empirical studies. Brenner and Izhakian (2011), for example, use this measure
to inquire into the question of whether stock prices are aected by ambiguity. Their empirical
study shows that ambiguity has a signicant negative impact on stock returns. To the best of
our knowledge, this study is the rst to measure ambiguity from market data, rather than in
laboratory experiments or calibrations.
To construct a useful measure of ambiguity, the paper introduces a novel model of decision
making under ambiguity, called shadow probability theory, generalizing Schmeidler's (1989)
Choquet expected utility and Tversky and Kahneman's (1992) cumulative prospect theory.
Shadow theory assumes that probabilities of observable events are random and dominated by
second-order unobservable events, modeled by two separated state spaces. The structure of
two separated spaces allows for a complete distinction between risk and ambiguity and between
preferences and beliefs. The degree of ambiguity and the decision maker's attitude toward it are
then measured with respect to one space, while risk and risk attitude apply to the second space.
In this model, subjective probabilities are framed by the nonlinear ways in which individuals
may process probabilities. Perceived probabilities are nonadditive: ambiguity aversion results in
a subadditive subjective probability measure, while ambiguity loving results in a superadditive
39Chen and Epstein (2002) extend the MEU model to continuous-time recursive multiple-priors utility and
demonstrate a separation between ambiguity premium and risk premium. Segal and Spivak (1990) also analyze
the ambiguity premium, which they call a premium of order 2.
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measure.
Ambiguity in shadow theory takes the form of probability perturbation with respect to a
reference point that distinguishes losses from gains. This concept provides a natural ambiguity
measure, f2, which proved to be empirically testable. The measure of ambiguity, f2, is simply
four times the variance of the probability of loss (or gain). The present paper demonstrates
the merits of this new model by incorporating ambiguous probabilities into the basic asset
pricing model. It generalizes the Arrow-Pratt theory and clearly dierentiates between the risk
premium and the ambiguity premium, which can both be measured empirically. The measure
of ambiguity, introduced in this paper, is an important tool that paves the way for studying
the empirical and behavioral implications of ambiguity for nance and economics.
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A Appendix
Lemma A.1. Assume a sake function  () satisng
1
2

 00 (pA)
 0 (pA)
2A  
 00 (pA[B)
 0 (pA[B)
2A[B

 pB;
for any events A;B  S. If A  B then Q(A)  Q(B).
Proof of Lemma A.1. Writing C = A [B, then by Theorem 3.5
Q (C) Q(A) = pA + pB + 1
2
 00 (pC)
 0 (pC)
2C   pA  
1
2
 00 (pA)
 0 (pA)
2A
= pB +
1
2
 00 (pA[B)
 0 (pA[B)
2A[B  
1
2
 00 (pA)
 0 (pA)
2A;
which, by the assumption of the Lemma, is non-negative.
Lemma A.2. Assume two equably symmetric directing acts y; z 2 cF with identical means.
Let ky and 
k
z be the kth moment around 0 of y and z respectively, then 
k
y (
2
z)
k
2 = kz
 
2y
 k
2
for any even k.
Proof of Lemma A.2. Without loss of generality, assume E [y] = E [z] = 0.40 Let Y =
yi+1   yi and Z = zi+1   zi, and recall that, since y and z share the same probability space,
 (yi) =  (zi), 8i = 1; : : : ;m. The 2kth moments of y and z can then be written as
P
i (iY )
2k
and
P
i (iZ)
2k, respectively, where i is the probability of the "i. Now,
 
2y
 2k
2 can be written
as
 P
i (iY )
2k and (2z) 2k2 can be written as  Pi (iZ)2k. Finally
ky (
2
z)
k
2 =
P
i (iY )
2k  Pi (iZ)2k = (Y Z)2k 2k+1Pii2k (Pii2)k
=
P
i (iZ)
2k  Pi (iY )2k = kz  2y k2 :
Lemma A.3. Assume two equably symmetric directing acts y; z 2 cF with an identical mean,
E [z] = E [y]. If  = z
y
then z =d y.
Proof of Lemma A.3. Without loss of generality, assume E [y] = E [z] = 0. To show that
=d it has to be proved that y and z have an identical characteristic function. Writing the
characteristic function of z
z (t) =
Pm
l=1 e
itzl (zl) dz =
Pm
l=1  (zl) + it
Pm
l=1 zl (zl) +
1
2
(it)2
Pm
l=1 z
2
l  (zl) +   
=
P1
k=0
(it)k
k!
kz = 1 + it
1
z   12t22z   13!it33z + 14!t44z +    ;
(13)
40Since E [y] = E [z], y and z can be adjusted such that they can be referred to as having E [y] = E [z] = 0.
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where kz , the kth moment around 0, and 
0
z  1 are assumed to exist and be nite. The
second equality is by the power series of the exponential function. For the third equality, see
Abramowitz and Stegun (1972, p. 928). Writing the kth moment of y around 0
ky =
mX
l=1
(yl)
k  (yl) =
kz
ky
ky:
Since E [y] = E [z] = 0 then, when k is even ky =
 
2y
 k
2 and kz = (
2
z)
k
2 , and when k is odd
ky = 
k
z = 0 . Note that the outcome spaces of z and y are identical. Lemma A.2 implies that
for an equably symmetric distribution ky = 
k
y
(2z)
k
2
(2y)
k
2
= kz for any k. Therefore, by Equation
(13) z (t) = y (t), which implies z =d y.
Proof of Theorem 3.5. The subjective probability, Q (Ej), of event Ej 2  can be written
Q (Ej) =   1 ( (pj   'j)) =   1
 
mX
i=1
i (Pi;j)
!
; (14)
for some 'j. Taking the rst-order Taylor approximation of  (pj   'j) around pj yields
 (pj   'j) t  (pj) +  0 (pj) (pj   'j   pj) =  (pj)  'j 0 (pj) : (15)
Ignoring the weighted summation in the RHS of Equation (14) for the moment, the second-order
Taylor approximation of  (Pi;j) around pj is
 (Pi;j) t  (pj) +  0 (pj) (Pi;j   pj) + 1
2
 00 (pj) (Pi;j   pj)2 :
Since  (pj),  
0 (pj) and  00 (pj) are constants, applying the weighted sum yields
mX
i=1
i (Pi;j) t  (pj) +
1
2
 00 (pj) 2j : (16)
Equating (15) to (16) and organizing terms yields
'j =  1
2
 00 (pj)
 0 (pj)
2j :
Substituting 'j into Equation (14) proves the theorem.
Proof of Proposition 3.7. By denition
21J =
mX
i=1
i (Pi;1J   p1J)2 :
Since P is additive and so is p,
21J =
mX
i=1
i [(Pi;1T   p1T ) + (Pi;T+1J   pT+1J)]2 :
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Therefore,
21J =
mX
i=1
i (Pi;1T   p1T )2 +
mX
i=1
i (Pi;T+1J   pT+1J)2 +
2
mX
i=1
i (Pi;1T   p1T ) (Pi;T+1J   pT J)
= 21T + 
2
T+1J + 21T;T+1J :
Proof of Lemma 3.8. Since Pi = Pi (E) is additive, Pci = Pi (Ec) = 1 Pi. The covariance
between P (E) and P (Ec) takes the form
Cov [P (E) ;P (Ec)] =
mX
i=1
i (Pi   p) (Pci   pc) =
mX
i=1
i (Pi   p) (p  Pi) ;
and therefore
Cov [P (E) ;P (Ec)] =  Var [P (E)] :
The second equality is obtained by
Var [P (E)] =
mX
i=1
i (Pi   p)2 =
mX
i=1
i (P
c
i   pc)2 = Var [P (Ec)] :
Proof of Proposition 4.3. This proof considers ambiguity aversion; the proof for ambigu-
ity loving is similar. Let z = Pj pj and y = Pl pl. Assume that z is more ambiguous than y,
then by Denition 4.2 z =d y + . The DM's preferences %2, characterized by the sake utility
 : [0; 1]! R (see Theorem 3.2), provides
E [ (z)] = E

E

 (y + )
 y :
Ignoring the expectation on the RHS for the moment, ambiguity aversion formed by a concave
 , implies
E [ (y + )]   (E [y + ]) =  (y) :
Taking expectations yields E [ (z)]  E [ (y)]. Hence, f^l %2 f^j.
For the opposite direction, let f^l %2 f^j. Then E [ (z)]  E [ (y)]. It needs to be shown
that there exists an  satisfying Denition 4.2. The proof considers two directing events. The
same approach can then be extended to any number of events. Let z and y take two possible
values, (z1; z2) and (y1; y2), with probabilities (; 1  ) and (; 1  ), respectively. Without
loss of generality, assume that z1  y1  y2  z2. The random variable  can be constructed
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by 1 = (z1   y1; z2   y1) with probabilities

y1 z2
z1 z2 ;
z1 y1
z1 z2

and 2 = (z1   y2; z2   y2) with
probabilities

y2 z2
z1 z2 ;
z1 y2
z1 z2

. It can be easily veried that the probabilities of 1 and 2 are all
positive, E

1
 y1 = 0 and E 2  y2 = 0. Therefore, y and  are mean-independent and
E [z] = E [y + ] = 0. The probability that y +  = z1 is

y1   z2
z1   z2 + (1  )
y2   z2
z1   z2 : (17)
Since y and z have the same expectation,  = z2 y2+(z1 z2)
y1 y2 . This implies that the probability
that y +  = z1 in Equation (17) is equal to , and the probability that y +  = z2 is equal to
1  . That is, z =d y + .
Proof of Proposition 4.5. Let z = Pj   pj and y = Pl   pl.
(i) Assume that Denition 4.2 holds. The condition Pj   pj =d Pl   pl +  implies that
Var [Pj] = Var [Pl] + Var [], which means that 
2
j  2l .
For the opposite direction assuming that Denition 4.4 holds such that 2j  2l . One can dene
 =
j
l
= z
y
 1. Since z and y are equably symmetric distributed and E [z] = E [y] = 0,
y is also equably symmetric distributed with zero mean, 2Var [y] = Var [z] and by Lemma
A.3 z =d y. Write x + y =  (x+ y) + (1  )x, where  = 1 and x is a random variable
satisfying E [x] = 0. By the Jensen inequality  (x+ y)   (x+ y)+(1  ) (x). Applying
expectation for both sides yields
E [ (x+ y)]  E [ (x+ y)] + (1  ) E [ (x)] : (18)
Since   1, By Denition 4.2, x+y is more ambiguous than x, thus E [ (x)]  E [ (x+ y)].
Together with (18), this implies E [ (x+ y)]  E [ (x+ y)]. Let x = 0. Then E [ (y)] 
E [ (y)] = E [ (z)], which means y %2 z.
(ii) Let  (z) =  e z. Taking a second-order Taylor approximation around z = 0 yields
 (z) t  1+ z  1
2
2z2. Since E [z] = 0, taking expectation yields E [ (z)] t  1  1
2
2Var [z].
This means that y %2 z i Var [y]  Var [z]. That is, i 2l  2j .
(iii) Let  (z) =   (z   )2, where z   for some . The expected sake function is E [ (z)] =
   Var [z] + (E [z]  )2. Since E [z] = E [y] = 0, then y %2 z i Var [y]  Var [z]. That is, i
2l  2j .
Proof of Model 4.7. Assume two symmetric acts with an identical expected outcome and
the same expected probabilities. The rst equality is derived by Theorem 4.8, which proves
that any ambiguity-averse DM prefers the act with the lower f2 over the act with the higher
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f2. The second equality is obtained by the fact that the variance of the probability of loss
equals the variance of the probability of gain (Lemma 3.8).
Proof of Theorem 4.8. Assume that f2 [g]  f2 [f ]. By Equation (5) the value assigned
by a risk-neutral DM to act g is
V (g) =
nX
j=1
pjxj +
1
2
kX
j=1

 00 (p1J)
 0 (p1J)
21J  
 00 (p1J 1)
 0 (p1J 1)
21J 1

xj +
1
2
nX
j=k+1

 00 (pJ N)
 0 (pJ N)
2J N  
 00 (pJ+1N)
 0 (pJ+1N)
2J+1N

xj:
Since f2 [g]  f2 [f ] and act f is rst-order stochastically dominated by act g, by Proposition
4.5, any Ej  S satises 2f;j = 2g;j + Var [], where  and Pj are mean-independent. The
subjective probability of event Ej  S under act f is, thus,
Q (Ej) = pj + 1
2
 00 (pj)
 0 (pj)
 
2j +Var []

:
Therefore, the value of act f is
V (f) =
nX
j=1
pjxj +
1
2
kX
j=1

 00 (p1J)
 0 (p1J)
 
21J +Var [1J ]
   00 (p1J 1)
 0 (p1J 1)
 
21J 1 +Var [1J 1]

xj +
1
2
nX
j=k+1

 00 (pJ N)
 0 (pJ N)
 
2J N +Var [J N ]
   00 (pJ+1N)
 0 (pJ+1N)
 
2J+1N +Var [J+1N ]

xj;
which implies that
V (f)  V (g) = 1
2
kX
j=1

 00 (p1J)
 0 (p1J)
Var [1J ]   
00 (p1J 1)
 0 (p1J 1)
Var [1J 1]

xj + (19)
1
2
nX
j=k+1

 00 (pJ N)
 0 (pJ N)
Var [J N ]   
00 (pJ+1N)
 0 (pJ+1N)
Var [J+1N ]

xj:
Organizing the terms of Equation (19) yields
V (f)  V (g) = 1
2
 00 (p1K)
 0 (p1K)
Var [1K ] xk +
1
2
k 1X
j=1
 00 (p1J)
 0 (p1J)
Var [1J ] (xj   xj+1) + (20)
1
2
 00 (pK+1N)
 0 (pK+1N)
Var [K+1N ]xk+1 +
1
2
nX
j=k+2
 00 (pJ N)
 0 (pJ N)
Var [J N ] (xj   xj 1) :
Since the DM is ambiguity averse, i.e.,  
00(pJN )
 0(pJN )
< 0 for any 1  j  n, and 0  (xj+1   xj),
the second component in the rst line of Equation (20) is positive, while the second component
in the second line of Equation (20) is negative. Because acts are symmetric with xk  xs, the
absolute value of the negative component is greater than the positive component. Thus, their
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sum is negative. The rst components in the rst line and in the second line of Equation (20)
are both negative; therefore, V (f)  V (g)  0, which implies g % f .
For the opposite direction, assume V (g)  V (f). Since all the parameters in the value
functions V (f) and V (g) of acts f and g are identical, except Var [PL], and rst-order stochastic
dominance is satised, Equation (20) implies that Var []  0. Thus, Var [PL] of act f is greater
than Var [PL] of act g. According to Lemma 3.8 this is also true for the probability of gain PG;
therefore, f2 [f ]  f2 [g].
Proof of Theorem 5.1. The rst-order Taylor approximation of the LHS of Equation (9)
with respect to E [x] is
LHS = U(E [x] K) =
nX
j=1
pjU(E [x] K) t
nX
j=1
pj (U (E [x]) KU0 (E [x])) :
Writing the RHS of Equation (9) as
RHS =
nX
j=1
pjU(xj)| {z }
I
 
 
kX
j=1
('1J   '1J 1)U (xj) +
nX
j=k+1
('J N   'J+1N)U (xj)
!
| {z }
II
;
the second-order Taylor approximation of I around E [x] is
I t
nX
j=1
pj

U(E [x]) + U0 (E [x]) (xj   E [x]) + 1
2
U00 (E [x]) (xj   E [x])2

= U(E [x]) +
1
2
U00 (E [x]) Var [x] :
Writing
II = '1KU(xk) + 'K+1NU(xk+1) +
k 1X
j=1
'1J [U (xj)  U(xj+1)] +
nX
j=k+2
'J N [U (xj)  U(xj 1)]
and taking the rst-order Taylor approximation of II around E [x] yields41
II t '1KU(xk) + 'K+1NU(xk+1) +
k 1X
j=1
'1JU0 (E [x]) (xj   xj+1) +
nX
j=k+2
'J NU0 (E [x]) (xj   xj 1) :
Since outcomes are assumed to be symmetrically distributed and xk is relatively close to E [x]
II t '1KU(xk) + 'K+1NU(xk+1) :
Because U (xk) = 0, and U () is almost linear around the reference point, xk, then U (xk) t
41Recall that 'j is the probability premium, holding an order of magnitude of the variance of probability.
Thus, 'j is smaller by one order of magnitude than probabilities.
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U(xk+1) t U0 (E [x]) E [x].42 Therefore,
II t
1
4

 1
2
 00 (pL)
 0 (pL)
  1
2
 00 (pG)
 0 (pG)

f2 [x] U0 (E [x]) E [x] :
Combining the LHS, the RHS, I and II, the uncertainty premium is
K t  1
2
U00 (E [x])
U0 (E [x])
Var [x]  1
8

 00 (pL)
 0 (pL)
+
 00 (pG)
 0 (pG)

f2 [x] E [x] :
Proof of Corollary 5.2. CRRA implies U0 (x) = x  and U00 (x) =  x  1. CAAA
implies  0 (qi) = e qi and  00 (qi) =  e qi . Substituting in Theorem 5.1 proves the corollary.
42See, for example, Segal and Spivak (1990) and Levy et al. (2003).
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